The AI SDLC / Part IV / §21
Section 21 of 44 12 min read

Tooling Evaluation Criteria

A vendor-agnostic scoring instrument, and how to read a vendor who cannot describe their own product's behavior.

This framework is deliberately vendor-agnostic, and this section is where that posture becomes actionable.

Two distinct question sets are needed and they are usually collapsed into one. The first is universal: a set of governance properties that any AI participant in delivery must satisfy regardless of what stage it serves, because they determine whether the organization can attribute, bound, revoke, and audit what the tool does. The second is stage-specific: the properties that actually differentiate two tools serving the same lifecycle stage, and which look entirely different for a requirements platform than for a pipeline agent. A procurement process that asks only the universal questions buys governable tools that do not fit the work. One that asks only the stage-specific questions buys capable tools that cannot be governed. Ask both.

21.1 Capability Classes by Stage #

Distinguish these classes, because they carry different risk, bind at different stages, and are frequently bundled and sold as a single product.

ClassStagesWhat it doesPrimary risk
Planning and portfolio intelligenceS1Forecasting, capacity modeling, work decomposition, consumption attributionFalse precision in estimates; consumption reported after the fact rather than forecast
Requirements and specificationS2Authoring, structuring, traceability, acceptance criteria generationGenerated specifications that are untraceable; criteria that no machine can check
Design and architectureS3Modeling, decision records, threat modeling, constraint definition, component catalogsArchitecture agents cannot read; constraints that exist only as documentation
Context and knowledge substrateS2–S7Indexes internal code, documents, and decisions, and exposes them to agentsRetrieval scoped wider than the invoking principal; poisoned or stale context
Inline assistantS4Completion and chat within the editor; no write authority beyond the developer’s own actionsQuality and comprehension; licensing exposure
Repository-resident agentS4Operates on a repository, opens branches and pull requests, runs toolsAuthorization, provenance, review saturation
Pipeline agentS4–S6Operates within CI/CD; builds, tests, triages, remediatesCredential blast radius; verification independence
Review and analysis agentS4–S5Reviews changes, triages findings, suggests remediationFalse assurance; triage suppression; ingesting untrusted content
Test and evaluationS5Evaluation harnesses, evaluation as a gate, red teaming, test generationMetric non-portability; self-consistent suites; unvalidated judges
Release and provenanceS6Signing, attestation, SBOM generation, release orchestrationProvenance emitted but never verified; AI components absent from the SBOM
Operations agentS7Acts on running systems: deploys, remediates, scales, respondsProduction blast radius; unreliable self-report
Observability and costS7Telemetry, evaluation in production, consumption attributionRecording mistaken for detection; cost visible only in aggregate
Agent platform / control planeAllGoverns which agents run, with what models, under what policyConcentration of authority; enforcement gaps between platforms

Two observations from this table are worth carrying into a buying decision. Most enterprise attention and most vendor investment sit in the generation-heavy classes (inline assistants, repository-resident agents, and pipeline agents), while the evidence in Section 3 places the binding organizational constraint in the two classes that absorb their output, review and analysis and test and evaluation. And the first four classes, which govern what everything downstream is actually working from, are the least likely to be evaluated as AI tooling at all, because they were usually bought years ago for other reasons.

21.2 Universal Criteria #

These apply to every class in the table above and are scored pass or fail, not weighted. A tool that fails several is ungovernable at any stage, however well it performs. Three carry evidence from elsewhere in this framework: automatic attribution that a user cannot correct corrupts the record it creates, which is one reason at least one major editor ships its equivalent setting defaulting to off;16 licensing exposure from training-data reproduction is small but non-zero and scales with context size, which is the direction agentic tooling is moving;49,50 and the measured cross-product merge conflict rate is roughly double the same-product rate, so multi-vendor strategies carry a cost no vendor comparison will surface.32

IDCriterionA strong answer containsA weak or evasive answer
U-1Identity and offboardingUnique principal per deployment; delegation chain inspectable after the fact; identities governable in your IdP as enforcement, not inventory; a described offboarding process”Agents run as a service account”; governance described as visibility; no answer at all on offboarding
U-2Credential modelTask-scoped, short-lived credentials; measured revocation time-to-effect”Credentials are stored securely”; revocation described but never measured
U-3Isolation and egressIsolation verified in the running environment; every outbound path enumerated; artifact proxy inside production vulnerability management; untrusted-input paths separated from privileged onesIsolation asserted from an architecture diagram; egress described as “restricted” without enumeration
U-4Configuration surfaceNamed list of files treated as executable or authoritative; approval bound to content hash; concealed characters filtered; defined behavior on a hostile repositoryConfiguration described as inert; approval bound to a server or tool name
U-5Provenance and attributionCryptographically verifiable attribution; model version recorded; exportable session record linking artifact to task, human, and tool set; attribution configurable with a stated defaultAttribution present but unsigned; no model version; session records visible in a console but not exportable
U-6Model dependencyDated snapshot pinning; stated notice commitment before version or safety-configuration changeAlias-only model selection; “we notify customers of material changes”
U-7Data handling and IPTraining use stated with the default named; retention period and jurisdiction stated; indemnity with exclusions disclosed; license matching surfaced at suggestion timeTraining use described as “may be used to improve the service”; indemnity referenced without its exclusions
U-8Telemetry and controlEmission in a documented schema ingestible by your pipeline; measured kill-switch time-to-effect; central administration of approved models and permitted agentsTelemetry available only in the vendor console; kill switch that reaches orchestrated agents but not local ones
U-9Concurrency and interoperabilityDescribed behavior under concurrent agents; scope partitioning supported; conflict behavior documented”Our agents coordinate automatically”; no position on other vendors’ agents
U-10ExitNamed export path for evaluation corpora and metric definitions, provenance records, session logs, agent definitions, instruction files, policy configuration, traceability identifiersData export offered for content but not for governance artifacts
U-11Assurance and incident commitmentMapping to a published agentic risk taxonomy with a stated shared-responsibility line; independent assessment of the agentic components specifically; a notification commitment and named incident support termsA platform-wide certification offered in answer to an agent-specific question

21.3 Stage-Specific Criteria #

These are weighted rather than pass-fail, because their relative importance depends on where the organization’s constraint sits. Score each 2 (met and demonstrated), 1 (partially met or met by roadmap), or 0 (not met). An unanswered criterion scores 0; the absence of an answer is data.

2Met and demonstrated
1Partially met, or met by roadmap
0Not met — or unanswered

Three criteria below rest on evidence stated earlier: between 36.7 and 55.7 percent of tasks in one study carried a known CVE in the dependency version the model specified, which is why S4-2 exists;64 the capabilities that most determine whether an organization realizes value are organizational rather than product properties, which is why S1-4 is a caution rather than a criterion;98 and published guidance exists on the security content that belongs in agent instruction files, which is what S3-5 scores against.99

S1Planning
IDCriterionA strong answer containsA weak or evasive answer
S1-1Consumption attributionCost attributable to team, repository, and taskAttribution to a billing account only
S1-2Consumption forecastingForward forecast with variance against actualsReporting after the period closes
S1-3Absorption modelingReview load modeled alongside delivery throughputThroughput dashboards with no review-side counterpart
S1-4Honest scopeVendor distinguishes what the product supplies from what the organization must supplyProduct claimed to deliver organizational capabilities such as an AI stance or platform quality
S2Requirements
IDCriterionA strong answer containsA weak or evasive answer
S2-1Machine-legible criteria exportStructured export a test generator or evaluation harness consumes without the vendor in the loopRequirements exported as prose or PDF
S2-2Traceability durabilityIdentifier survives into branches, commits, tests, and release records in systems the vendor does not ownTraceability maintained only inside the vendor’s own graph
S2-3Generated-requirement markingDrafts marked as generated with the model recordedGenerated and authored requirements indistinguishable after save
S2-4Non-functional expressionNFRs expressible as numeric budgets with named ownersNFRs captured as free-text intentions
S2-5Probabilistic requirementsThreshold, corpus reference, and measurement method as first-class fieldsModel-backed behavior described in the same fields as deterministic behavior
S3Design
IDCriterionA strong answer containsA weak or evasive answer
S3-1Enforceable constraint outputConstraints emitted in a form the build can enforceConstraints rendered as diagrams and documents only
S3-2Agent-legible design surfaceDesign representation surfaceable to a coding agent as authoritative contextDesign accessible only through the vendor’s UI
S3-3Artifact governanceConstraint and instruction artifacts live in version control, reviewableArtifacts held as platform configuration outside review
S3-4Reuse discoveryComponent catalog answers “does something like this already exist”Search over names rather than over capability
S3-5Instruction-file security contentInstruction files carry dependency, package-manager, pinning, and integrity-verification guidanceInstruction files treated purely as style configuration
S3-6Threat model comparabilityFindings mapped to a published taxonomyBespoke severity language, not comparable across teams
S4Development
IDCriterionA strong answer containsA weak or evasive answer
S4-1Merge boundary, demonstratedLive demonstration that the agent cannot self-approve, mark its own PR ready, trigger CI unauthorized, push to protected branches, or edit its governing rulesetDocumentation offered in place of a demonstration
S4-2Dependency version resolutionVersions resolved against vulnerability policy, not accepted as the model specified themModel-specified versions written directly into the manifest
S4-3Package existence and provenance checksExistence, age, and maintainer provenance checked before installChecks run after install, or at scan time only
S4-4Risk-tiered reviewReview requirements assignable by path and change classUniform review policy with per-repository granularity only
S4-5Review integrity telemetryApproval rate, review duration, and diff size at approval reportedMerge counts reported without review-quality signal
S4-6Concealed-character handlingIngested content filtered for zero-width and bidirectional charactersNo stated position on invisible-rendering content
S5Verification
IDCriterionA strong answer containsA weak or evasive answer
S5-1Evaluation as a local gateEvaluations run inside your CI without a vendor callbackGating available only through the vendor’s hosted pipeline
S5-2Metric transparency and portabilityDocumented metric computation; corpora and results exportable in an open formatNamed metrics with undisclosed computation
S5-3Judge validationValidation against human labels supported as a first-class workflow, with chance-corrected agreement reportedJudge scores presented as ground truth
S5-4Suite sensitivityMutation or property-based testing establishes that a suite would fail on a defectLine coverage reported as the quality signal
S5-5Remediation verification independenceThe verifier of a suggested fix is independent of the model that produced it, with false-negative rates disclosedTime-to-fix improvements published; false negatives not measured
S6Release
IDCriterionA strong answer containsA weak or evasive answer
S6-1Signed provenanceAttestations in a standard predicate format, verified at consumptionProvenance emitted but never checked
S6-2Agent-authorship predicateSupport for a custom predicate carrying agent authorship metadataAuthorship recorded only in commit trailers
S6-3AI-inclusive SBOMSBOM covers AI components including model lineage and dataset provenanceSBOM covers packages only
S6-4Authorship in the release recordAgent-authored and human-authored change distinguishable without manual reconstructionDistinction reconstructable only by querying commit history by hand
S6-5Quality-distribution promotion gatesPromotion gated on evaluation score, refusal rate, or task completion distributionPromotion gated on error rate alone
S6-6Model version change as a releaseProvider version change traverses the release gateModel version treated as runtime configuration
S7Operations
IDCriterionA strong answer containsA weak or evasive answer
S7-1Schema-versioned telemetryPublished schema you can pin and version, given these conventions remain development-stageProprietary event shapes that change without notice
S7-2Unit cost observabilityCost attributable per task and per agentAccount-level billing only
S7-3Kill-switch reachHalt reaches agents in developer environments and third-party platforms, with measured time-to-effectHalt reaches orchestrated agents only
S7-4Intra-snapshot drift detectionBehavioral change detected within a pinned snapshotA deprecation calendar offered as drift detection
S7-5Continuous validationEvaluation suite runs against production traffic on a schedule with distribution alertingEvaluation available pre-release only

21.4 Scoring and Use #

  • Run U-1 through U-11 first, as gates. They are pass or fail. A vendor failing three or more should not proceed to stage scoring, because the stage capability will not survive the governance gap.
  • Score the stage criteria only for the stages the tool actually serves, using the capability-class table in 16.1 to decide which apply. Scoring a requirements platform against S6 produces a low number that means nothing.
  • Weight stage fit by where your constraint actually is. Most organizations shop for stage four generation speed. The evidence in Section 3 places the binding constraint in stage five verification capacity and in the review load that stage four generates. Weights that mirror the evidence rather than the sales motion produce a different shortlist, which is the point of scoring at all.
  • Weight the universal criteria above capability. Capability improves rapidly and converges across products; governance architecture is set at design time and rarely changes. A tool that generates excellent output and cannot be governed will be replaced within eighteen months at considerable cost. A tool that generates adequate output inside a sound authorization model will still be serviceable.
  • Resolve the suite-versus-best-of-breed question deliberately. The concurrency finding argues for fewer agent products operating on the same repository. The portability and exit criteria argue against a single vendor owning the measurement layer, because a vendor that both generates and grades is not an independent verifier. The reconcilable position is to consolidate the things that write and diversify the things that measure.
  • Demand demonstrations for U-1 through U-5 and for S4-1. All six are testable in an afternoon, and all six are areas where vendor documentation and shipped behavior have diverged in public. Score a documented-but-undemonstrated claim as 1, never 2.
  • Record vague answers as findings rather than as zeros. A zero says the capability is absent; a finding says the vendor could not describe its own product’s behavior, which predicts the support relationship. The pattern worth watching for is a confident answer about the platform’s general security posture offered in response to a specific question about agent behavior.

References cited in this section

7 of 243 · numbering matches the PDF

  1. 16Microsoft, "Visual Studio Code Release Notes, Version 1.110," March 2026. The `git.addAICoAuthor` setting offers `off`, `chatAndAgent`, and `all`, and ships defaulting to `off`.code.visualstudio.com/updates/v1_110 ↗
  2. 49Gaia Colombo, Leonardo Mariani, Daniela Micucci, and Oliviero Riganelli, "On the Possibility of Breaking Copyleft Licenses When Reusing Code Generated by ChatGPT," arXiv:2502.05023, 2025. Preprint.arxiv.org/abs/2502.05023 ↗
  3. 50Albert Ziegler, "GitHub Copilot Research Recitation," The GitHub Blog, June 30, 2021 (updated August 16, 2022). 2021 data, Python only, original Copilot model; the only rigorous first-party measurement located.
  4. 32George Xu, Arjun Subramanian, and Nithilan Karthik, "AI Agent Pull Requests on GitHub: Frequency, Structure, and Merge Conflict Rates," arXiv:2607.04697, July 6, 2026. 33,596 agent-authored pull requests across 2,807 repositories. Conflict rates rest on 601 intra-agent and 115 cross-agent evaluable pairs; the authors describe the figures as a conservative lower bound measuring textual conflicts only. Preprint.arxiv.org/abs/2607.04697 ↗
  5. 64Chengjie Wang, Jingzheng Wu, Xiang Ling, Tianyue Luo, and Chen Zhao, "Correct Code, Vulnerable Dependencies: A Large Scale Measurement Study of LLM-Specified Library Versions," arXiv:2605.06279, May 7, 2026. Preprint.arxiv.org/abs/2605.06279 ↗
  6. 98Google LLC, DORA AI Capabilities Model, v2025.1, 2025. Seven capabilities: clear and communicated AI stance; healthy data ecosystems; AI-accessible internal data; strong version control practices; working in small batches; user-centric focus; quality internal platforms.services.google.com/fh/files/misc/2025_dora_ai_capabilities_model.pdf ↗
  7. 99Avishay Balter et al., "Security-Focused Guide for AI Code Assistant Instructions," OpenSSF Best Practices and AI/ML Working Groups, August 1, 2025.best.openssf.org/Security-Focused-Guide-for-AI-Code-Assistant-Instructions ↗
PDF